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THE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT- A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTRACTION
by
Julian M. Meer*
T HE Federal Securities Act of 1933, as amended,' has been law
for some thirty-two years. A whole generation of corporate
attorneys has been educated and licensed and has reached mature
middle age since the act became law; and it would be a true "old
timer" who could remember what it was like to formulate a syndi-
cation of securities without the act's requirements being the center-
piece of his timetable and agenda.
For all of the act's accumulation of history and acceptance, the
problems of application and interpretation have increased rather than
decreased as the years have passed. Designed to cure many of the
excesses of promotional activity and manipulation which culminated
in the 1929 stock market crash, the act has seen the annual dollar
volume of registered securities grow from $4.8 billion during the
Commission's fiscal year ended June 30, 1936, to $19.4 billion during
the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965.' The total value of stocks listed
on exchanges has increased from $74.7 billion as of December 31,
1936, to $506.8 billion at December 30, 1964.4
The investment banking industry, after bitterly fighting the pas-
sage of the act, readily adapted to its provisions. The traditional pat-
tern of securities underwritings was soon modified to minimize the
additional risks occasioned by the civil liability provisions of the act,
and insofar as the act applies to the normal firm-commitment under-
writing method of public securities distribution, compliance with the
act has become a routine part of corporate legal practice.' Many of
the now-established procedural techniques have developed through
* Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas; B.B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern
Methodist University; formerly Supervising Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission.
1 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964) (hereinafter cited either
as the "Securities Act" or the "1933 Act").
"See Halleran & Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of and Trad-
ing in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86, 104-07 (1959); Cohen, Federal Legislation
Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 119 (1959), two of a
series of articles in an issue devoted to the silver anniversary of the SEC.
'31 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 161 (1965).
4 Id. at 167.
' National Ass'n of Sic. Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 451-56 (1945). For discussions of
changes in investment banking procedures which followed the adoption of the act, see 1
Loss, S1zcuarrss REGULATION 159-78 (2d ed. 1961).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
an interplay of ingenuity between the corporate bar of the larger
financial centers and the staff of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. The drafters of the original act contemplated a registration
statement consisting of detailed answers to an elaborate questionnaire,
which would be summarized into a compact readable prospectus
delivered to each prospective securities purchaser prior to purchase.
Certain issuers developed the technique of answering the registration
form items by cross-references to the prospectus, and in 1945 with
the adoption of the first "form S-1," the Commission codified this
practice." The heart of the registration statement on form S-1 is the
prospectus which includes, in addition to the textual description of the
issuer, its history, business, management, use of proceeds and descrip-
tion of the securities being registered; a balance sheet; at least a five-
year statement of earnings; supplementary profit and loss informa-
tion; footnotes to the financial statements; and a description of the
underwriting and distributing arrangements.
The need for numerous copies to facilitate the examination pro-
cess and the development of the "red-herring" or preliminary pros-
pectus, now virtually mandatory,' has resulted in costs of registra-
tion including printing and legal and accounting fees of at least
$25,000 for even a small issue of securities." Meanwhile, the regulation
A exemption procedure (which permits the sale under its require-
ments by an issuer of up $300,000 of securities in a twelve-months
period) has evolved from a simple letter of notification procedure to
substantially a complete registration process with costs approximat-
ing that of full registration.! That procedure has for the most part
become too cumbersome and expensive for small financings in an en-
terprise's early years."
As a result, the economic need for reliance on the private-offering
exemption by small and moderate sized business concerns has in-
creased rather than diminished through the years. Nevertheless, due
to an increasingly large body of court and administrative law, re-
6 Securities Act, form S-1, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 8110.
7 Rule 460 under the 1933 act provides that in ruling upon requests for acceleration of
the effective date of the registration statement, the Commission will take into consideration
the adequacy of the distribution of the preliminary prospectus. CCH FED. Suc. L. REP.
3860.
'See SEC, COST OF FLOTATION OF CORPORATION SECURITIES-1951-55 (1956); Garrett,
Private v. Public Financing, 18 Bus. LAW 118 (1962).
'General Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Act of 1933, Rules 251-63,
SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-63 (1964) (All 1933 act rules are published in the
Code of Federal Regulations as title 17, part 230 and will be cited hereafter by number
only.) The regulation is the subject of an 129-page article: Weiss, Regulation A Under the
Securities Act of 1933-Highways and Byways, 8 N.Y.L.F. 3 (1962).
"0 See Sargent, Private Offering Exemption, 21 Bus. LAW 118, 123 (1965).
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liance upon the exemption has become ever more risky." Much of the
administrative-law aspects depend upon the attitudes of those mem-
bers of the SEC staff who are responsible for issuing interpretive
opinions and conducting Commission proceedings, both administra-
tive and judicial. The scope of the exemption is then a combination
of the practical and the theoretical. The determination of whether
the lawyer has in fact correctly advised his client as to the exemption's
availability (or whether the client has correctly availed himself of the
exemption without benefit of attorney's advice-all too frequently
the case) may depend upon whether the availability is ever chal-
lenged, and, if so, in what forum.
The heart of the securities act is section 5 which makes it unlawful
to use the mails or interstate commerce to offer securities for sale un-
less a registration statement has been filed and to consummate any
sales unless the registration statement has become effective, and which
requires that all written offers be made by means of, or be accom-
panied or preceded by, a prospectus which meets the appropriate
requirements.1 The prospectus requirement of the securities act has
become increasingly important and is the requirement most frequent-
ly overlooked by the client who would like to register his securities
once and for all. Almost every corporate lawyer has received from a
client the suggestion: "While we're at it, why don't we register all of
my stock, so I'll be free to sell it as and when I want."
In truth, however, the effectiveness of a prospectus is a fleeting
thing-perhaps good for as little as ninety days or less,1" of doubtful
validity after nine months, and certainly past history after the lapse
of sixteen months from the date of the audited financial statements
in the prospectus. 4 Also, under section 6 (a) of the act, a registra-
Is "[Elven today, after more than thirty years, there is a kind of continuous tug of war
between Commission and bar as to whether new, borderline situations belong on one side
or the other of the all-important boundary." Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1340, 1348 (1966). Graham L. Sterling stated in a panel discussion before
the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the American Bar Association at the
1959 annual meeting, "Without stopping to trace the developments in the administrative
and judicial interpretation of the exemption, I think I can safely state there is still such an
exemption, even though it is but a shadow of its former self," Sterling, Possible Solution
To Problems in the Private Placement of Convertible Securities and Warrants Under the
Federal Securities Act, 15 Bus. LAW 145, 147 (1959).
'2 1933 Act § 5.
13 with respect to certain deferred offerings, the SEC has required an undertaking to
file a post-effective amendment prior to any public offering commenced more than ninety
days after the effective date of the registration statement. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS (1962) 203-12
(hereinafter cited as "P.L.I. CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS"). See also statement by W.
McNeil Kennedy in Symposium on Current Problems of Securities Underwriters and Dealers,
18 Bus. LAW 27, 71 (1962).
" Section 10(a) (3) provides that a prospectus used more than nine months after the
effective date must contain information not over sixteen months old. Rule 427 requires that
1966]
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tion statement is deemed effective only as to securities specified therein
"as proposed to be offered."'" The Commission normally will not per-
mit a "shelf registration" of securities for which there is no present
intention to offer." The registration statement has thus evolved into
the fulfillment of the requirements for a particular transaction or
series of transactions rather than for the registration of the security
itself." However, difficulties arise because only the issuer can register
its securities. There is no way that a securities owner, who does not
contractually provide in advance for the issuer to prepare and file a
registration statement upon assurances of reimbursement of the
costs, can require the registration of the securities. Thus, the right
that a purchaser of securities in a non-registered offering has sub-
sequently to resell the securities within the next two or three years
will depend in large part upon the arrangements he makes with the
seller at the time he acquires his securities." This will be discussed be-
low under the "investment-letter" practice.
This article will discuss primarily the legal problems of an issuer
who sells securities in reliance on the non-public offering exemption.
To a lesser extent it will consider the legal status of the owner of
non-registered securities originally acquired from an issuer or a
controlling person in reliance upon the non-public offering exemption
who later wants to sell. References will be made to the more im-
portant published judicial and administrative decisions and to law
review and other papers on the section 4 (1) and 4 (2) exemptions.
I. STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO PRIVATE-OFFERING
EXEMPTIONS
A. Definitions
Section 5 of the Securities Act, considered out of context, appears
to cover under regulatory provisions all offers and sales of securities
which involve use of the mails or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce. Section 4, however, exempts
transactions by everyone other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer;
there must be included in any prospectus used after nine months certified financial state-
ments not over sixteen months old. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 4060.
"The last sentence of S 6(a) provides: "A registration statement shall be deemed
effective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered."
"e See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 112 (Israels &
Duff ed. 1962) (hereinafter cited as "P.L.I. WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC"); Hodes,
Shelf Registration: The Dilemma of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 VA. L.
REv. 1106, 1139 (1963).
"7 See Flanagin, The Federal Securities Act and the Locked-In Stockholder, 63 MICH. L.
REv. 1139, 1141 (1965).
'
8 Id. at 1167-68.
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dealer transactions except those within forty to ninety days after a
public offering of the security; and day-to-day brokerage trans-
actions." Any discussion of the section 4 exemptions must, therefore,
start with the statutory definitions of the terms "issuer," "under-
writer," and "dealer."" Section 2 (4) defines the term "issuer" to
mean "every person who issues or proposes to issue any security."
Not particularly profound for a general definition, the section is
more specific with respect to less ordinary types of securities such as
equipment trust certificates, fractional mineral interests and others
not here material. The definition of the word "dealer" to mean "any
person who engages either for all or part of his time, directly or indi-
rectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buy-
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by
another person" conforms with the usual understanding of the term
in the securities business."
The definition of the term "underwriter," however, makes that
term a word of art under the act. The definition is fundamental in
considering what transactions are exempt from the registration and
prospectus requirements of the act pursuant to section 4. The term
is defined in section 2 (11) of the act as follows:
The term 'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from
an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection
with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or
indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has
a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such under-
taking ...As used in this paragraph the term 'issuer' shall include,
in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling
or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect com-
mon control with the issuer."
B. The Exemptions
Section 4, insofar as is relevant to the scope of this paper, provides
as follows: "Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 5 shall not apply to-
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or
dealer. (2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing. . . ." The exemption in clause (1) is the basis on which general
"A dealer, whether or not he participated in the distribution, must deliver a prospectus
for such period of time with respect to any securities sold under a registration statement;
ninety days if the issuer has not previously had an effective registration statement, and
forty days if it has.
"0 1933 Act §§ 2(4), 2(11), 2(12).
21 1933 Act § 2(12).
2"That someone could be an underwriter without any contractual relationship with the
seller and without receiving any of the proceeds or other compensation was early determined
in SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1941).
1966]
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open-market trading is exempt from registration under the act and
governs the status under the act of subsequent transactions by persons
who have purchased securities from an issuer in a transaction which
purports to be exempt under clause (2). This, as we shall see, relates
back to the definition of the term "underwriter" above, and gives rise
to the problem related to the concept of holding for investment pur-
poses discussed below. The term "distribution" in the definition of
"underwriter" in section 2 (11 ) is in practice considered substantially
synonomous with the term "public offering" in section 4 (2). The
definition also governs the rights of persons who are deemed to be
in control of the issuer to sell securities of the issuer without regis-
tration."
II. PossrBLE CHALLENGES TO RELIANCE UPON EXEMPTION
Section 12 (1) provides:
[Any person who] ... offers or sells a security in violation of section
S . . . shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the
security.""
Section 24 provides: "Any person who wilfully violates any of the
provisions of this sub-chapter . . .shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."'"
The determination of whether a seller may rely upon the private
offering exemption in any given sale of securities is initially one for the
seller and its counsel. There is no statutory procedure whereby the
SEC may give a ruling which will afford absolute protection to the
seller from either civil or criminal liability for a sale without regis-
tration. The risk on the seller is increased by the well-established prin-
ciple that the burden of proving an exemption from the registration
provisions of the act is on the party claiming the benefit of such
'a H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at
551; Orrick, Some Interpretative Problems Respecting the Registration Requirements Under
the Securities Act, 13 Bus. LAW 369, 370 (1958).
"For a comprehensive discussion of the problems of controlling stockholders and persons
who have purchased securities under investment restrictions, see Flanagin, supra note 17;
P.L.I., CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS. Good discussions of the rights of controlling stock-
holders to dispose of securities are presented in Sommer, Who's "In Control"?-S.E.C., 21
Bus. LAW 559, 583-86 (1966); Frank, Sale of Securities by "Controlling Persons" Under
the Federal Securities Act, 14 HAST. L. JouR. 137 (1962). See also Comment, 78 HARe.
L. REV. 1635-50 (1965).
2 1933 Act S 12(1).
20 1933 Act 5 24.
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exemption. 7 However, the Commission has from its earliest history
made available both in its regional offices and in its central office in
Washington interpretive advice on the application of the act to
specific fact situations. With respect to most exemptions, including
the section 4 exemptions, upon presentation of a written request for
an opinion setting forth applicable facts and analysis by counsel for
the seller, counsel for the Division of Corporation Finance will trans-
mit a so-called "no-action" letter stating that the staff would not
recommend that the Commission take any action if the prospective
seller proceeds accordingly with the sale. Such letter customarily
concludes with the caveat that it is not binding on the Commission
or upon the courts but is merely an expression of opinion of Com-
mission's counsel.28 The no-action letter is, however, as a practical
matter, reasonable assurance that the SEC will not institute proceed-
ings for an injunction under section 20(b) of the act or make a
criminal reference to the Department of Justice. Such opinion is also
practical protection against future adverse action by the Commission
in the event that the seller for a subsequent transaction files a regis-
tration statement or reports under one of the acts administered by
the Commission.
The question of whether the exemption was properly relied upon
may subsequently be raised in either informal or formal administra-
tive action by the SEC or the following possible litigation: an
injunctive suit by the Commission to prevent future unregistered
sales in violation of the act; a civil suit by a purchaser who becomes
disenchanted with his purchase (usually by reason of disappointment
in the economic results); or a criminal action under section 24 of the
act. In general, it can be stated that, no criminal proceeding will
be brought for failure to register, absent a showing of fraud or fla-
grant disregard of the act. Likewise, the Commission is not apt
to institute injunctive proceedings unless there has been an offering
of substantial size or one involving a substantial number of offerees.
If the issuer files a registration statement under the act within
three years after a transaction has been effected without registration,
the prior transaction will be reviewed by the staff. In fact, generally-
applicable registration forms under the act include a question re-
qu;ring the registrant (1) to furnish information as to all securities
sold by the registrant within the past three years which were not
'S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Edwards v. U.S., 312 U.S.
473 (1941); Capital Funds, Inc. v. S.E.C., 348 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1965); Gilligan, Will
& Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); S.E.C. v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d
Cir. 1959); S.E.C. v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938).
28 See P.L.I. CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS, 15-18, 126-31.
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registered under the act; (2) to indicate the section of the act or rule
of the Commission under which exemption from registration was
claimed; and (3) to state briefly the facts relied upon to make the
exemption available.29 If the registrant has had transactions of sub-
stantial scope in reliance upon the private-offering exemption, the
disclosure of the transactions in the registration statement and pros-
pectus poses a dilemma. If the staff of the Commission does not agree
that the exemption was applicable, it will require that a contingent
liability for possible claims under section 12 (1) be recognized in the
financial statements in the prospectus. There have been several stop-
order opinions in part based upon the failure to show such contin-
gent liability."0 However, in such cases there were other very material
misrepresentations or omissions of material facts, and it cannot be
determined that a stop-order would be issued merely because of fail-
ure to register prior transactions.
A similar requirement for the justification of prior sales without
registration is provided in the form of notification under regulation
A. As mentioned earlier, this is a somewhat abbreviated form of reg-
istration to permit the sale of up to $300,000 of securities by an issuer
in any one year or a sale by a controlling stockholder not to exceed
$100,000 in any one year provided that not over $300,000 in sales
may be made by the issuer and all controlling stockholders during any
year. 1 If the staff concludes that the exemption was not in fact avail-
able on a prior transaction within a year, the amount of such sale is
charged against the amount of securities which may be offered. Simi-
lar problems as to contingent liabilities and the possibility of a sus-
pension order exist here as in full registration statements."
The same requirement for the justification of sales of securities
without registration is provided in the form for registration of shares
under the Securities Exchange Act in connection with the listing of
securities on a national securities exchange and with the registration
of equity securities under section 12 (g) of the Exchange Act by com-
panies having assets of over $1,000,000 and having outstanding a
class of equity securities held by more than 500 holders of record."
Substantially the same explanations are requested in the forms of
periodic reports which have to be filed by companies whose securities
,re recistered under section 12 of the Exchange Act and by those
291933 Act, form S-I, item 26; form S-2, item 16; form S-3, item 15; form S-11,
item 30; form N-5, item 32. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 8245.
" See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 114-18 infra.
"' 1933 Act, regulation A, form I-A, item 9. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5746.
32 See note 118 infra. and accompanying text.
"Form 10, item 17 of 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78a-ji (1964)
(hereinafter cited as the "1934 Act").
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issuers who are required to file periodic reports under section 15 (d) of
the Exchange Act by reason of a prior registration statement filed
under the Securities Act.3" A violation of section 5 revealed in periodic
reports or in an investigation by the SEC can result in an order from
the Commission suspending trading in the issuer's securities.
Transactions effected in reliance upon exemption from registration
under the Securities Act by a broker-dealer who is registered as such
under section 15 of the Exchange Act may also come before the SEC
for review." Violations of the securities act by such broker-dealer are
grounds for disciplinary action, which may lead to suspension or rev-
ocation of registration or of membership in a registered securities
association."' A number of the Commission's disciplinary orders
against dealers have included, among other violations, the participa-
tion by such dealer in sales transactions which the Commission found
were not exempt from registration as non-public offerings. Here
again, for the most part, violations of the registration provisions were
accompanied by other grounds for disciplinary action such as fraud
and unreasonable sales spreads or discounts.
III. SOURCES OF PRECEDENT FOR THE EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS
The development of legal precedents relating to private offering
exemptions is a typical case history showing the evolution of admin-
istrative law. The law has developed through a number of sources,
including, in addition to court opinions, opinions of counsel for the
seller or buyer in day-to-day transactions, both informal private
interpretations and formal administrative decisions by the SEC and
its staff, and law review articles and legal periodicals. While private
opinions of counsel do not immediately establish a body of legal
authority, nevertheless, by the extent to which various members of
the financial bar have reflected their views in legal institutes, law
review articles and other legal writings, a body of authority has been
established." No one source has contributed as much to the estab-
lishment of citable precedent as Professor Loss's comprehensive treat-
34 1934 Act, form 8-K, item 7; form 10-K, item 2.
3' Since the 1934 act was amended in 1964, the Commission has the authority to suspend
trading in over-the-counter as well as listed securities. 1934 Act §§ 15(c) (5), 19(a) (4).
381934 Act § 11(a), (b).
311934 Act § 1(b)(5)(D).
" See cases in text accompanying notes 105-13 infra.
" See Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAW 931 (1963),
19 Bus. LAW 593 (1964), 20 Bus. LAW 595 (1965), 21 Bus. LAW 703 (1966), which
annually supplement Throop & O'Boyle, 16 Bus. LAW 828 (1961). The Practicing Law
Institute has held several forums and summer courses on securities act problems, two of
which were printed. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC (Israels
& Duff ed. 1962); S.E.C., PROBLEMS OP CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDER-
WRITING (Israels ed. 1962).
1966]
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ise on securities regulation.' His original text was based upon his
extensive experience in writing and reviewing interpretive opinions
while on the staff of the SEC. Subsequent citations of the treatise as
authority in judicial opinions have elevated many conjectures and
personal judgments to the status of judicial authority citable as such
in later cases.
Likewise, the greatest volume of administrative interpretations by
the staff of the SEC consists of informal correspondence, either in
response to requests for interpretive letters or in comments upon
registration statements, regulation A offering circulars, and notifica-
tions and periodic reports filed with the Commission. Occasionally, a
problem of such importance will arise that the Commission will pub-
lish a release setting forth an interpretation by the Commission or its
counsel-and there have been several of these with respect to the
private offering exemptions."' Ordinarily, however, SEC interpreta-
tions are not available as a source of authority for general guidance
except to the extent that various staff members from time to time
have participated in legal institutes and bar association programs and
have published papers in legal periodicals. Formal administrative deci-
sions and interpretive releases and decisions in contested cases, includ-
ing stop-order decisions and broker-dealer disciplinary decisions, are
an important source of legal precedent.
These informal and administrative sources of precedent may ulti-
mately become judicial precedent by reason of litigation resulting
from legal actions instituted by the SEC, appeals from administra-
tive decisions of the SEC to the United States courts of appeal, and
cases among private litigants. The private offering exemption is one
of the few to have been the subject of a comprehensive opinion by
the United States Supreme Court. Since the Court's interpretation
of the private-offering exemption with respect to stock offerings to
employees in S.E.C. v. Ralston-Purina Co.,"' the trickle of judicial
decisions has expanded to a moderately heavy stream, particularly
those by federal district courts. Some of the decisions have held offer-
ings of such limited scope to be non-exempt making reliance on the
40 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (1961) (three volumes, hereinafter cited as "Loss"
with appropriate volume number).
4 SEC Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10952, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
2740 (1935); SEC Securities Act Release No. 603, 11 Fed. Reg. 10955, CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5 2750 (1935); SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862, 11 Fed. Reg. 10962 (1938);
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 2770
(1962).
41346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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private-offering exemption in any transaction a calculated business
risk at best.'
IV. ELEMENTS OF THE EXEMPTION
As Professor Loss states in his treatise, the few words, transaction
by an issuer not involving any public offering, "support a substantial
gloss."' To encapsulate the history of the requirements of the exemp-
tion, an offering by an issuer to qualify as a non-public offering must
meet two basic tests: 5
(1) The group of persons to whom the offering is made avail-
able must be limited in number and must have some sort of rela-
tionship to the issuer either by prior association or by bargaining abil-
ility so as to be able to obtain comprehensive information about the
issuer. In the early history of the exemption, the SEC placed consid-
erable emphasis on the necessity of a relatively small number of
offerees, it being generally considered that an offering to not more
than twenty-five persons would ordinarily not be a public offering.
Later history has highlighted the need of the offerees for protection
and access to information of the kind available in a registration
statement.
(2) The persons who have purchased the securities in such non-
public offering must acquire the securities as ultimate purchasers, not
as conduits to other beneficial owners or subsequent purchasers. Each
original purchaser's conduct and state of mind must not make him
an "underwriter" as defined in section 2 (11), i.e., the exemption will




-See, e.g., Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965); Repass v. Rees,
174 F. Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959); Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Levine, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 5 91,496 (N.Y. 1965) [discussed infra at text accompanying notes 91-97].
" I Loss 653. The various state blue sky laws have tried to avoid the problems of
interpretation by spelling out specific limits. Thus, § 402 (b) (9) of the Uniform Securities
Act, CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 4932, provides an exemption for an offering to not more
than ten persons in the state during any period of twelve consecutive months if no com-
missions are paid for solicitations and the seller reasonably believes that all buyers are buying
for investment, with authority in the administrator to increase or decrease the number of
offerees. In this Symposium, see Wolens, Hidden Gold in the Blue Sky Laws, 20 SwV. L.J.
578, 579 (1966). See also Loss & COWETT, STATE SECURITIES REGULATION 81-83, 366-77
(1958), and as to the Texas Securities Act, Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings
of Corporate Securities-The Prohibition on Advertisements, 20 Sw. L.J. 299 (1966);
Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings of Corporate Securities, 18 Sw. L.J. 537
(1964); Meer, The Texas Securities Act-1957 Model; Facelift or Forward Look?, 36
TEXAS L. REv. 429 (1958), updated in Meer, A New Look at the Texas Securities Act, 43
TEXAS L. REv. 680 (1965).
'See also Evans, A Review of Small Business Financing, 14 Bus. LAW 568, 570-72
(1959); Mulford, Private Placements and Intrastate Offerings of Securities, 13 Bus. LAW
297-302 (1959); Sargent, Private Offering Exemption, 21 Bus. LAW 118 (1965).
"An excellent summary of the case development of these principles is set forth in
Wood, The Investnment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
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In the earlier cases the SEC was busy hammering out in the courts
and in its own administrative opinions basic principles. In an early
opinion interpreting the intrastate offering exemption, the Commis-
sion held that the exemption requirements had to be met as of the
time of completion of the ultimate distribution and not merely upon
the closing of the sale by the issuer to three investment banking
firms that redistributed an issue to residents outside the state of
incorporation of the issuer." It took the persuasive powers of the
best legal talent the Commission could muster to convince the Court
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in 1938 that an offering to 530
persons, all of whom were stockholders of two corporations, was a
public offering when the offering was not open to the general public."
Admitted abuses in what were patently artificial claims of the avail-
ability of the exemption to financings of extensive scope frequently
have resulted in both Commission and court decisions of a sweeping
nature, furnishing language quotable in subsequent cases where the
claim to the exemption was bona fide.4
V. NUMBER AND CHARACTER OF OFFEREES
A General Counsel's opinion published in 1935 was the only com-
plete exposition by the SEC of its interpretation of the exemption
until 1962."° The gist of that interpretation was that the determina-
tion of whether a particular transaction involves a public offering
depends not on any one factor but on all of the surrounding circum-
stances, including the following: (1) the number of offerees and their
relationship to each other and to the issuer; (2) the number of
units offered; (3) the size of the offering; and (4) the manner of
offering. The interpretation pointed out that the basis on which the
offerees are selected is of greatest importance and indicated that
where the offerees are chosen from the general public at random, the
offering may be found to be a public offering even though only a
small number of offerees is involved. The opinion also suggested
1043 (1964). The various questions posed by the exemption, public vs. private, investment
vs. distribution, shelf registrations, convertible securities, warrants, employee offerings and
related problems are pithily outlined in Cohen, supra note 11, at 1348-50.
4 Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 170 (1935). See also Oklahoma-
Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939).
48 S.E.C. v. Sunbeam Goldmines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938). See also Merger
Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1943).
41 See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); S.E.C. v. Cul-
pepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959); S.E.C. v. Mono-Kearsage Consol. Mining Co., 167
F. Supp. 248 (D. Utah 1958), discussed at text accompanying notes 103-04 infra. Crowell-
Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (1956).
50 Opinion of General Counsel, SEC Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10952
(1935), CCH FED. SEc. L. RE'. 5 2770.
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that an issue in small units or an issue of substantial size is more apt
to be a public offering than an issue of small size and a relatively
small number of units, and indicated that the sale of the issue through
the machinery of public distribution, such as securities brokers and
sellers, was more indicative of a public offering. The opinion referred
to, and apparently concurred with, an interpretation made by the
Federal Trade Commission during its administration of the act that
an offering to not more than twenty-five persons would ordinarily
not be a public offering. The figure of twenty-five offerees was gen-
erally used as a reasonably reliable rule of thumb for a valid exemp-
tion." It is elementary, but nevertheless important to emphasize, that
the rule of thumb referred to the number of offerees and not the
number of actual purchasers."
The turning-point in the history of the numbers criterion was the
only section 4 case to come before the United States Supreme Court,
S.E.C. v. Ralston-Purina Co.," decided in 1953. The case commenced
with an action by the Commission to enjoin the Ralston-Purina
Company from continuing its practice of offering and selling shares
of stock to its employees without filing a registration statement under
the act. At the time of the case, the company had over 7,000 em-
ployees. Between 1947 and 1952, the company received more than
$2 million from sales of stock to its employees in annual stock offer-
ings to more than 400 employees who while being designated as "key
employees," actually included comparatively minor employees with
salaries as low as $2,400. Both the district court and the court of
appeals held against the Commission. The Supreme Court rejected
the contention of the Commission that the large number of employees
to whom the offering was open was determinative of a public offering
without the consideration of any other facts, but it reversed and ren-
dered for the Commisison, stating:
The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full dis-
closure of information thought necessary to informed investment de-
cisions. The natural way to interpret the private-offering exemption is
in light of the statutory purpose. Since exempt transactions are those
"Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 111-12 (D. Minn. 1958); 1 Loss
662-64; THOMAS, FEDERAL SECURITIEs ACT HANDBOOK 31 (1959) (Publication of Joint
Committee on Continuing Legal Education); Mulford, Private Placements and Intrastate
Offerings of Securities, 13 Bus. LAw 297, 301 (1958); Orrick, Some Observations on the
Administration of the Security Laws, 42 MINN. L. REv. 25, 33 (1957).
52 1 Loss 656; See Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan, 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943)
which held that an open-end voting trust necessarily involved a public offering no matter
how small the number of persons for whom the trust was created. The classic statement is
contained in Nash v. Lynde (1929) A.C. 158, quoted in S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 125 n.11 (1953).
"346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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as to which "there is no practical need for [the bill's] application,"
the applicability of Section 4 (1) should turn on whether the particular
class of persons affected need the protection of the Act. An offering
to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a trans-
action "not involving any public offering. ' ' "
While the case would appear to result in a diminishing significance
of the numbers test as an upper-quantity limit rather than a lower-
quantity limit,"5 subsequent decisions by the SEC in stop-order and
broker-dealer disciplinary decisions and in its latest interpretative
release published in 1962" and recent federal court opinions have not
made that distinction." Thus, it is risky to rely on any numerical
rule of thumb unless the kind of offerees qualifies under the general
language of the Ralston-Purina case." The general views of the Com-
mission can be gleaned from the following paragraph from the re-
lease:
Traditionally the second clause of Section 4(1) [now Section 4(2)]
has been regarded as providing an exemption from registration for bank
loans, private placements of securities with institutions, and the pro-
motion of a business venture by a few closely related persons. How-
ever, an increasing tendency to rely upon the exemption for offerings
of speculative issues to unrelated and uninformed persons prompts
this statement to point out the limitations in its availability. 9
The interpretation gives a green light to private placements with
institutional investors such as insurance companies, banks, and pen-
sion trusts. The placements usually involve the sale of debt securities
which may or may not be convertible into or be accompanied by
warrants to purchase common stock. 0 Where such placements involve
54 Id. at 124-25. In United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), the court,in overruling the contention that the term "public offering" was so amorphous as to make
the criminal statute unconstitutionally vague, stated: ". . . the judicial gloss placed on
this legislation by the Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. RalstonPurina Co. . . . two years before the acts here charged, cured any defect which might
have existed."
55 1 Loss 661.50SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (1962); CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 5 2770.
" The Supreme Court also was particularly concerned about the employer-employee
relationship, stating, "The obvious opportunities for pressure and imposition make it advisable
that they [employees] be entitled to compliance with Section 5."
" See Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. REv.
869 (1959).
59 See note 56 supra.
" See Richardson, The Private Placement Method of Financing, 45 CHI. BAR Rc. 328(1964). For a viewpoint that direct placements of substantial dollar amounts of debt securi-
ties should be registered on anti-trust principles, see Steffen, The Private Placement Exemp-
tion: What to Do About a Fortuitous Combination in Restraint of Trade, 30 U. CHI. L.
REv. 211 (1963), disputed in Cohen, Should Direct Placements Be Registered?, 43 N.C.L.
REV. 299 (1965), and rejoined by Steffen, Private Placements Should Be Registered, 43
N.C.L. REV. 548 (1965).
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as many as eighty or ninety officers, the Commission has acquiesced
in the availability of the section 4(2) exemption, either by trans-
mitting no-action letters or by raising no question in connection with
later registration statements."' Certainly the offerees are able to "fend
for themselves," as demonstrated by the fact that they often obtain
from the issuer even more information than the SEC requires in a
registration statement. Where a new business is being started or an
existing business is being expanded with proceeds from the sale of
securities to investors outside the immediate promoter group, and
where such securities do not appeal to the institutional investor, a
cautious approach is warranted both as to numbers and type of
offerees. The twenty-five offeree rule of thumb may be followed on
a calculated business-risk basis, but the hazards must be realized.
'Where the offerees are individual investors-and especially where an
investment banker participates in the placement-the number of
offerees as well as the number of actual purchasers should be kept to
the absolute minimum; the size of the units should be as large as
possible; the offerees should be persons well known to the management
of the issuer or to the investment banker; and they certainly should
be sophisticated investors who are represented by their own counsel."'
VI. THE HOLDING-FOR-INVESTMENT REQUIREMENT
The second condition precedent for the non-public offering exemp-
tion, that the entire offering come to rest as an investment in the
hands of the purchasing group, has also become difficult to establish.
Any purchaser who does not have the requisite investment intent
(as demonstrated by sales within a relatively short period of time)
may be an "underwriter" as defined in section 2 (11), thus voiding
not only his own possible exemption under section 4 (1) when he
sells but also, ab initio, the exemption under section 4 (2) for the
original sale. Of course, the intent of an original purchaser from the
issuer is a subjective concept. At least in theory a purchaser may
have a good-faith intent to hold for an indefinite period of time and
shortly thereafter may change his mind without destroying the
exemption. But the length of time the purchaser has actually held
the securities is evidentiary as to his actual intent. This time element
of the exemption also had an early-established rule of thumb which
was generally accepted as being one year. It was based on an opinion
of the General Counsel issued in 1938 in which he stated, "it is
1 Loss 663, 689-96; Orrick, supra note 51 at 33.
e2 See Loomis, Enforcement Problems under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bus. LAW
665 (1959). See also Victor & Bedrick, supra note 58 at 881.
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my opinion that if they [the securities] were retained for a period
as long as a year that fact would be sufficient, if not contradicted by
other evidence, to create a strong inference that they had been pur-
chased for investment."6 The opinion went on to state such inference
was rebuttable and, "for example, would fail in the face of evidence
of a pre-arranged scheme to effect a distribution at the end of the
year."y
In an effort to help establish objective evidence of the purchaser's
intent, the financial bar developed the technique of requiring each
purchaser, either in the purchase contract itself or in a separate writ-
ten instrument, to make a written representation or covenant that
he was acquiring the securities for investment and not with a view
to distribution. Such covenant, whether set forth in the purchase
agreement or in a separate letter, came to be known as an "invest-
ment letter." The investment letter was originally a one- or two-
sentence statement substantially in the words of section 2 (11) to
the effect that the purchaser was acquiring for investment and not
with a view to distribution. The letter has since expanded into a col-
lection of long elaborate clauses. As Professor Loss states in his
treatise, "In fact, some law firms seem to be quite fond of their own
peculiar formulas, which in recent years have sometimes become as
elaborate as a paragraph in a trust indenture."' It also became the
practice to require that a legend incorporating by reference the
investment agreement be placed on the stock certificate itself and
to have the transfer agent note a stop-transfer on the stock ledger.6
The elaboration of the contents of the investment letter was an
outgrowth of efforts to meet the language of the Commission and
the courts in the several cases resulting from the sale by Crowell-
Collier Publishing Company of approximately $3 million of con-
vertible debentures in August, 1955, and an additional $1 million in
May, 1956, in reliance on the private-offering exemption. The deb-
entures, which in form were sold to twenty-seven purchasers in 1955
and to twenty-two purchasers in 1956 pursuant to investment letters,
"3SEC Securities Act Release No. 1862 (1938) oP. cit. supra note 41; 1 Loss 668,
671-72; Voelkner, The Securities Act of 1933 and Stockholders of Acquired Corporations,
1965 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (Winter 1965).
641 Loss 666; P.L.I. CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS 27-28; Israels, Some Commercial
Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. REV. 851, 861 (1959).
6A typical legend is as follows: "The shares represented by this certificate have not
been registered under the Securities Act of 1933. The shares have been acquired for invest-
ment and may not be sold or transferred in the absence of an effective registration thereof
under that Act, or an opinion from counsel satisfactory to the Company that such registra-
tion is not required." See Israels, supra note 64, at 869; Israels, Problems incident to Use
of Stop-Transfer Procedures and the Securities Act of 1933-Addendum to Uniform Com-
mercial Code-Article 8, 17 RUTGERs L. REv. 158 (1962); PRACTICING LAW INsTITUTE,
op. cit. supra note 39 at 22-23.
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ended up, partly as stock, in the hands of at least eighty-nine persons
or firms within ten months. It appeared that the investment letter
requirement was treated as a mere formality. The Commission, deny-
ing the exemption upon an investigation, outlined the various types
of holdings which in its opinion did not meet its concept of the re-
quisite holding for investment."0 The Crowell-Collier matter and sub-
sequent cases has resulted in a holding-period requirement varying
from two to as many as five years. 7 Early attempts by a substantial
number of purchasers to sell or at least to obtain clearance for sale
may result in a taint of the entire transaction, correctible, if at all,
only by a registration statement. A lawyer practicing in the field of
securities regulation is met almost daily with the question: "How long
do I have to hold my securities in order to comply with my letter?"
The immediate answer might be that the mere asking of the question
is objective evidence negativing the intent to hold for investment. An
attorney in one of the Commission's regional offices was heard to have
expressed the view that what is required is an intent to put the securi-
ties in a safe-deposit box and throw away the key.
Seemingly the SEC attempts to insure that any time there has been
a sale by an issuer or its controlling stockholders of a substantial
quantity of securities in reliance on the section 4 exemption, the
seller will effectively provide for the registration of those securities
at some time shortly prior to the time that such securities are sold into
the general public market. 8 If prior to such registration a substan-
tial quantity of the securities finds its way into the open market, the
66SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (1957).
An exemption under the provisions of Section 4(1) is available only when
the transactions do not involve a public offering and is not gained by the
formality of obtaining 'investment representations'. Holding for the six
months' capital gains period of the tax statutes, holding in an 'investment
account' rather than a 'trading account,' holding for a deferred sale, holding
for a market rise, holding for sale if the market does not rise, or holding for
a year, does not afford a statutory basis for an exemption and therefore does
not provide an adequate basis on which counsel may give opinions or business-
men rely in selling securities without registration.
The release and its significance is succintly discussed in Fooshee & McCabe, Private Place-
ments-Resale of Securities: The Crowell-Collier Case, iS Bus. LAw 72 (1959).
67In U.S. v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) in a criminal contempt pro-
ceeding, where the government had the burden of proving a distribution in violation of the
act beyond reasonable doubt, the court stated that a two-year holding period was "an
insuperable obstacle" to finding an intent to distribute. Form S-14, a special form provided
for resales of securities by controlling persons of an acquired corporation in a rule 133
transaction, requires an undertaking to keep the registration statement up to date for two
years. See Voelkner, supra note 63 at 13. In Friedman v. Chemical New York Trust Co., 153
N.Y.L.J. 14, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,519 (1965), 153 N.Y.L.J. 14, the New York
trial court held that holding stock for five years before attempting to sell was at least prima
facie proof that the stock was acquired for investment purposes, and should be deemed
conclusive evidence absent evidence to the contrary. See also P.L.I., WHEN CORPORATIONS
Go PUBLIC at 19-20; P.L.I. CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS at 30.
6' See Israels, upra note 64; See Wood, supra note 46, at 1057.
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Commission, to say the least, will be greatly concerned. Any sub-
sequent registration statement for the issuer or its controlling stock-
holders will be closely scrutinized for possible contingent liability
disclosures, and court or administrative proceedings may very well
result. 9
The purchaser desiring to resell at sometime short of the minimum
safe-holding period has one possible out. If he can establish that his
desire or need to sell is caused by a change of circumstances not fore-
seeable at the time of his purchase, such sale may not be inconsistent
with his investment covenant, and he might even be able to get a
no-action letter from Commission counsel."0 Ordinarily, a change in
circumstance must be a personal one to the holder rather than a
change in the business fortunes of the issuer which are deemed normal
business risks." For some reason, the purchase of a house, which would
appear to be a normal event in the life of an investor, has generally
been accepted as a valid change in circumstances." Unusual sickness
or business adversities not attributable to the stock market are other
possible valid changes in circumstance. The need to sell the security
to pay a related bank loan will not be such a change of circumstance;
in fact, the necessity of a loan to make the purchase weakens the
entire investment representation. There have been some statements
by Commission staff that a pledge may itself be a sale in violation of
the investment covenant."'
VII. POSITION OF THE HOLDER OF INVESTMENT-RESTRICTED
SECURITIES
Under present administrative attitudes, the purchaser of securities
sold under the private offering exemption is the orphan of the regu-
latory scheme. Controlling stockholders of the issuer have the power
to cause the issuer to register their securities. Controlling stockholders
69 See, e.g., Hazel Bishop, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 718 (1961).1. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, op. cit. supra note 41, the interpretation states
as follows with respect to change in circumstances: "An unforeseen change of circumstances
since the date of purchase may be a basis for an opinion that the proposed resale is not
inconsistent with an investment representation."
71 Gilligan, Will & Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Orrick,
Non-Public Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations in the Exemptions Under the
Federal Securities Act, 21 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 16 (1959).
78 See Orrick, supra note 71; Victor & Bedrick, supra note 58, at 874.
"aSee Mulford, Private Placements and Interstate Offerings of Securities, 13 Bus. LAW
297-302 (1958). In Release 4552, the Commission stated, "Possible inability of the pur-
chaser to pay off loans incurred in connection with the purchase of the stock would ordi-
narily not be deemed an unforeseeable change of circumstances. Further, in the case of
securities pledged for a loan, the pledgee should not assume that he is free to distribute with-
out registration." S.E.C. v. Guild Films Co., Inc. 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
Santa Monica Bank v. S.E.C., 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
741 Loss 672; Mulford, supra note 73, at 299, Orrick, supra note 23, at 372.
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also have available a procedure to sell a small quantity of securities
without registration (assuming such securities are not subject to
investment restrictions). Rule 154, adopted under section 4 (4) of the
act, is available to their broker so that there is no "underwriter" in
the transaction and the sale is exempt under section 4 (1) .7 If their
company merges into another company or effects a sale of assets for
securities of another company, the transaction will probably be
exempt from registration under rule 133.' 'While as controlling stock-
holders of a constituent corporation, they will be underwriters if they
acquire the new securities in the acquiring corporation with a view to
distribution, rule 133 (d) permits each such controlling stockholder
to sell in any six-month period the amount not deemed to be a dis-
tribution (the same quantity as provided in rule 154)." However,
the average holder of investment-letter stock may not be able to sell
under the section 4(1) exemption until the amorphous time period
necessary to establish the investment intent has elapsed, unless he can
establish a change in personal circumstances that will enable him to
get the requisite opinion of counsel or a no-action letter.78 Then too,
he is always subject to the hazard that his co-purchasers may already
have destroyed the exemption ab initio by having sold such quantity
that a distribution has already occurred. If there have been no resales
until after one year from the time the issuer or controlling persons
effected the original sales transaction, the original seller may well
argue that he is protected by the one-year statute of limitations in
section 13, but this does not protect the statutory underwriter."'
75 Section 4(4) exempts: "brokers' transactions executed upon customers' orders on any
exchange or in the over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders." Under
rule 154, the term is defined to include "transactions by a broker acting as agent for the
account of any person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, the
issuer . . ." where the broker performs only the usual broker's functions and is not aware
that the transactions are part of a distribution. The rule indicates that a distribution shall
not be deemed to be involved where, in an over-the-counter security, transactions effected
by the same person over the past six months did not exceed one per cent of the outstanding
shares or units of the class or in the case of a listed stock not in excess of the lesser of one
per cent or the largest aggregate volume of trading during any one of the preceding four
calendar weeks. Limitations on the rule are outlined in SEC Securities Act Release No. 4669
(1964), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 2920. See P.L.I., CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS, §§ 47-68;
Sommer, Who's in Control?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAw 559, 588-91 (1966); Hill, Rule 154
Under the Securities Act of 1933 and Related Problems-A Proposed Solution, 20 Bus. LAW
335 (1965).
76 Rule 133 provides that for the purposes of § 5 of the act, no offer for sale or sale,
as involved in the submission to vote of stockholders of a statutory merger or consolidation
or a proposal for transfer of assets for securities in a tax-free reorganization where the vote
of a required favorable majority, will bind all stockholders except to the extent of dissenting
stockholders, being entitled to appraisal rights.
71 See Voelkner, supra note 63, at 1-18.
1 P.L.I. WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, at 32; P.L.I. CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS,
at 38.
" Section 13 provides no action shall be maintained "to enforce a liability created under
section 12(1) unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based."
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The question as to when the limitations period as to the issuer starts
to run when there are sales which have tainted the entire issue is
another one of those fascinating exercises in fine-spun theory with
which the Securities Act abounds. In deciding from what point in
time a registrant should show a contingent liability in the financial
statements in its prospectus, the staff of the Commission takes the
position that the violation does not occur until the time a distribution
is effected by the original purchaser(s), rather than at the time of
the issue of such unregistered securities. Thus, a contingent liability
must be reflected for at least one year thereafter.
There is some support among the financial bar and the staff of the
SEC that a rule 13 3 transaction does not make investment letter stock
freely tradeable and that the investment-restriction attaches to the
securities of the new corporation acquired in a rule 133 transaction.?
It would seem to this writer that a merger of the issuer into another
company or the sale of its assets to another would be an obvious
change in circumstance not readily foreseeable at the time of the
purchase. Perhaps the wise course for any holder of investment-letter
securities who is not part of management or a sponsor of a plan of
amalgamation would be to vote against the plan, and even assert his
appraisal rights, if any."
In order for a purchaser in a private offering exemption transac-
tion to protect his right to sell, the purchase contract should provide
that the issuer will register the securities at the request of the holders
of a certain amount of securities. Such an agreement is usually re-
quired in private placements with institutional investors, particularly
if the securities involved are debt securities which are convertible into
stock or are accompanied by stock-purchase warrants. 82 While it is
arguable that the inclusion of a registration covenant in the purchase
agreement is evidence of a lack of investment intent, if no sales are
made by the original purchasers until the securities are registered,
the transaction between the issuer and the initial purchasers would
appear not to require registration, since it would be a preliminary
agreement between an issuer and any underwriter and, therefore,
not an offer or sale within the definition of section 2 (3) .a
Once the issuer agrees to register, other problems may be encoun-
" See Orrick, Registration Problems Under the Federal Securities Act-Resales Following
Rule 133 and Exchange Transactions, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 (1958).
" P.L.I., CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS, at 39.
12 See P.L.I., WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC, at 20.
"The terms defined in this paragraph ["sale," "sell," "offer to sell," "offer for sale,"
or "offer"] . . . shall not include preliminary . . . agreements between an issuer . . . and
any underwriter .... " 1933 Act § 2(3).
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tered. Registration of outstanding stock held by a number of indi-
vidual security holders for sale into the open market without the
benefit of a firm-commitment underwriting arrangement is fraught
with difficulty. This was demonstrated by the Hazel Bishop stop-
order case, where the Commission delineated the problems created
by an attempted registration for sale by a number of purchasers in
an uncoordinated distribution.84 While a procedure for permitting
the registration statement to become effective ultimately was negoti-
ated with the Commission, for a while it looked like the answer was,
"You can't get there from here." 5 The most satisfactory solution to
the resale problem is, of course, a firm-commitment secondary under-
writing."
The investment-holding requirement is applicable to institutional
investors as well as private individuals. For example, rule 155 con-
cerning convertible securities was adopted by the Commission in
February, 1962 (over two years after its original submission for
comment in accordance with the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act).", The rule provides in part as follows:
The phrase "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing" in Section 4(2) of the Act shall not include (1) any public
offering of a convertible security (which at the time of such offering
is immediately convertible into another security of the same issuer) by
or on behalf of any person or persons who purchased the convertible
security directly or indirectly from an issuer as part of a non-public
offering of such security, or (2) any public offering by or on behalf
of any such person or persons of the security acquired on conversion
of a convertible security, unless the security so acquired was acquired
under such circumstances that such person or persons are not under-
writers within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the Act.
The rule contains language to permit the transfer of the convertible
security to intermediate holders who themselves do not acquire with
a view to distribution.8 The object of the rule is, of course, to require
8440 S.E.C. 718 (1961).
8" See Hodes, Shelf Registration: The Dilemma of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 49 V.. L. REV. 1106 (1963); Flanagin, The Federal Securities Act and the Locked-In
Stockholder, 63 MicH. L. REV. 1139, 1167-69 (1965).
88 1933 Act, rule 155.
871933 Act, rule 155.
88 Paragraph (b) of the rule provides:
"The phrase 'transactions by any person other than an ... underwriter' in
Section 4(1) of the Act shall, in the situations covered in paragraph (a), be
deemed to include transactions by the initial, and any intermediate, holder of
the convertible security or of the underlying security who (1) has not
acquired the convertible or underlying security with a view to the distribution
of either of them, and (2) is not effecting, is not causing to be effected, and
has not arranged for, a public offering of either security within the meaning
of and subject to paragraph (a) of this rule."
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that the convertible securities, or the securities into which they have
been converted, be registered shortly prior to the time that they are
sold into the open market. It is important to note that the rule applies
to non-public offerings even if registered at the time of the sale to
the original purchasers. Much early comment on the rule in its initially
proposed form 9 concerned its effect on previous placements and the
position of institutional investors who had not provided in the pur-
chase agreements covenants for registration. The rule as finally
adopted was made applicable only with respect to convertible secur-
ities issued after February 7, 1962, the effective date of the rule.'
VIII. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
That the application of the private offering exemption principle
enunciated in the Ralston-Purina case is not an exact science can be
illustrated by a sampling of the administrative and judicial opinions
promulgated since the Supreme Court's opinion.
A. Civil Suits Under Section 12(1)
Section 12 (1) gives the purchaser of a security sold in violation of
the registration and prospectus provisions in section 5 a cause of
action to recover the consideration paid or a valid defense against a
suit brought to enforce an agreement to purchase securities. Several
cases, also showing the inclusiveness of the term securities, involve
the sale of fractional interests in oil and gas leases or similar property
rights and demonstrate how strictly the exemption may be con-
strued with respect to offers to a small number of persons.
In Repass v. Rees,' the District Court of Colorado, in a suit to
8 The historical background, position of the SEC and of those in opposition to the rule
are extensively discussed in 1 Loss 673-87. See also Orrick, supra note 80, at 15-22. A
running debate was carried on in volume 15 of The Business Lawyer. See Sterling, Possible
Solutions to Problems in Private Placement of Convertible Securities and Warrants Under
the Federal Securities Act 145 (1959); Gadsby, Private Placement of Convertible Securities,
at 470 (1960); Comments of Members of Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
at 493; Fooshee & McCabe, Questions as to SEC's Legislative Authority to Adopt Rule 155,
and of its Constitutionality, at 508; Lund, Private Placements and Proposed Rule 155, Gen-
eral Comments, at 516.
90 1933 Act, rule 155(c).
91 174 F.Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959). In Lynn v. Caraway, CCH FED. SEc. L. REp.
91,664 (W.D. La. 1966), four purchasers of a Y/th interest in a producing oil and gas
lease were awarded a judgment under § 12 (1) for recovery of the $33,530 purchase price
and $3,350 in attorney's fees. It appeared from the opinion that one of the plaintiffs had
approached the defendant, a lease broker, seeking an oil and gas investment, and the parties
had visited the lease site in person and had made inquiry about the defendant through banks.
While the case involved the question whether the defendant, who purchased the entire work-
ing interest from one of the other defendants and sold fractions to the plaintiff, was an
issuer, the court recognized that in order for the sale of a mineral interest to be the sale
of a security by an issuer, there had to be a "subdivision of a portion of the owner's inter-
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rescind a purchase of'an oil and gas lease interest, while finding that
the plaintiffs were experienced businessmen and investors who did not
need the protection of the act, held that defendants had not sus-
tained the burden of proving their right to the exemption merely by
testifying that they had sold to only nine persons in one tract and
four persons in another tract, since it was incumbent upon them to
introduce evidence as to how many offers were made to other per-
sons and as to the experience of the buyers other than the plaintiffs.
In Nicewarner v. Bleavins,2 the same court held for the plaintiffs
in a suit for the return of moneys paid to purchase a percentage inter-
est in a retained inventor's royalty, where the record showed only
one sale other than to the plaintiffs. In again deciding that the de-
fendants had failed to sustain the burden of proving the exemption,
the court stated:
Here, the only evidence is that Bleavins made at least one sale other
than to the Nicewarners. There is no evidence as to how many offerees
there were, what information they received, or whether they needed
the protection afforded by registration. In these circumstances, we are
unable to say that Bleavins did not make a public offering. Conse-
quently, Bleavins is liable under Section 12 (1).
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Woodward v.
Wright," while holding that a sale of oil and gas interests to four
persons was entitled to the exemption since the purchasers were the
type persons able to fend for themselves, nevertheless, held for the
plaintiff on the ground that the defendants had made untrue state-
ments of material facts.
In Garfield v. Strain,"4 an action involving recission of a purchase
contract on the ground that the transaction concerned the purchase
and sale of an unregistered security, the same court found that the
defendants had effectively sustained the burden of proving their right
to the private-offering exemption in a sale of an undivided one-half
interest in an oil and gas lease. There, the number of units offered
and sold were "few," a close relationship existed between buyer and
seller, and the transaction was small in size ($10,500); moreover,
apparently most important in this case, because of his wide business
est for the purpose of a public offering." The defendant did not defend the case, and the
defense of no public offering was not presented. In MacClain v. Bules, 275 F.2d 431 (sth
Cir. 1960), a seventy-four year-old wheat farmer who had been in school only through the
third grade and his wife were held to be entitled to recover their purchase price in three
$10,000 purchases of stock in a Colorado oil company, the court finding plaintiffs had been
solicited as part of a general offering in the area.
9a 2 4 4 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).
"3266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959).
94320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963).
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experience in several businesses including the securities market and
ownership of oil stocks, the buyer was able to fend for himself and
was not in need of the protection of the act. The United States Dis-
trict Court of Minnesota in Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co.,5 involving
a sale of oil and gas lease interests to three persons, refused to go
outside the record to speculate as to the nature of other transactions
involving the same tracts and held for the defendant.
A sophisticated obligor, such as an investment banker, will ordinar-
ily not be permitted to avoid his contract on the ground that it was
contemplated that his own obligation involved a sale of unregistered
securities. Thus, in Fuller v. Dilbert," an investment banking firm
which had guaranteed the purchase of a twenty-seven per cent block
of stock brought an action for a declaratory judgment to void a con-
tract on the ground that the contract by its terms contemplated a
public distribution in violation of section 5 of the Securities Act. The
plaintiff argued that all parties were aware that the purchaser who
was the primary obligor could not himself finance the transaction and
that it was contemplated that he would designate other investors
described as "designees" to take portions of the stock. The court held
that the plaintiff could not void the contract on the ground that a
public offering might be involved, stating:
Section 12 of the Securities Act which creates civil liability on
the part of one who sells stock in violation of Section 5 does not require
that a purchaser and his guarantor be permitted to escape their con-
tractual obligations where the violation is brought about by the
purchaser's wrong-doing in which the seller did not participate and
of which he was without knowledge. No public interest requires this
result. To so hold would supply a built-in defense to a purchaser,
who by the very violation of his agreement would at once effectively
relieve himself of all his other obligations thereunder. It would vir-
tually destroy the utility of the private offering since any purchaser
of investment stock could insure himself against the future by the
simple expedient of offering or selling a small slice of his purchase
to the public in violation of the Act, thus enabling him unfairly to
get rid of an unfavorable agreement.'
9s 183 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1958); see also Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975
(D. Pa. 1951). Recission was granted to the plaintiffs in Stadia Oil & Uraniam Co. v.
Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957) in an offering predicated upon the intrastate offer-
ing exemption.
go 244 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). To the same effect, see The Value Line Fund, Inc.
v. Marcus (S.D.N.Y. 1965), CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 5 91,523. It is interesting to note that
in Fuller v. Dilbert the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief which presented the view that
the plaintiff was not among those entitled to take advantage of an alleged § 5 violation
resulting from the purchaser's distribution of stock in breach of his covenant.
97 244 F. Supp. at 213. For a similar court expression see Royal Air Properties, Inc. v.




B. Injunction Suits Brought By SEC
Section 21 (a) of the Securities Act gives the SEC the right to bring
an action in any federal district court for an injunction to restrain
violations of any provisions of the act." The Ralston-Purina case
involved such an action brought by the SEC.9 An injunction by its
terms enjoins the defendant from using the means of interstate com-
merce or the mails to sell securities unless registered under the act
or exempt from registration. Subsequent sales in violation of the
injunction subject the defendant to criminal contempt proceedings.
In U. S. v. Custer-Channel Wing Corp.'8 the defendant corpora-
tion and certain officers had been enjoined from selling stock of the
company without registration. Three years later, the United States
Attorney acting at the instance of the Commisison filed an applica-
tion for contempt proceedings based on the sale of over 1,500,000
shares sold for approximately $400,000 from time to time, to three
separate purchase groups and approximately twenty individual buyers,
each purchaser signing an investment letter. The court, after sum-
marizing the Ralston-Purina case and the SEC's November 1962 re-
lease, held that a public offering in violation of the injunction was
involved.
That there is little likelihood that an attempt to effect a widespread
distribution of securities by the use of intermediary purchase groups
will be successful is amply demonstrated by successful injunction
actions. In the Crowell-Collier case, the Commission conducted an
investigation under section 19 (b) of the act and published its findings
in a release.' The Commission's statement reflects that the use of
investment letters is a useless formality if the transaction involves a
substantial distribution to non-institutional investors. '
Injunction cases supporting the SEC in this viewpoint include
SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co.,"a involving a sale of a
block of 962,000 shares to one person subsequently'resold to the gen-
eral public through nominees, and SEC v. Culpepper... involving
the sale of over 700,000 shares of stock acquired in exchange for
assets of a Canadian corporation.
: 1933 Act § 22(a).8346 U.S. 119 (1953).
100247 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md. 1965).
'0' SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 76,539 (1957).
... This was succinctly put by the present General Counsel of SEC, "Where, however,
such letters are regarded as a mere ritual insulating the transactions from the registration
requirements, they become worthless." Loomis, supra note 62, at 669.
's3 167 F. Supp. 248 (D. Utah 1958).
'04 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959), afrirming SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 167
F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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C. Broker-Dealer Disciplinary Cases
Under section 15 of the Exchange Act, the Commission is given
the authority to censure, suspend for a period of not more than
twelve months, or revoke the registration of any broker-dealer if it
finds that such censure, suspension or revocation is in the public
interest and that such broker or dealer has willfully violated any
provision of the Securities Act of 1933."'O The Commission may also
suspend such broker or dealer from membership in the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) under section 1 5A,
which effectively bars such broker or dealer from participating in
syndicates with other members or from having any transactions with
other members during the period of such suspension.' It was in a
broker-dealer proceeding against Ira Haupt & Co. that the SEC first
held that the broker's exemption in section 4 (4) [then section 4 (2) ]
could not be used to effect a distribution for a controlling stock-
holder."5' Subsequently, the Commission brought broker-dealer dis-
ciplinary proceedings against several broker-dealer firms which had
participated in the Crowell-Collier distribution. The only proceeding
which was appealed to the courts was Gilligan, Will & Co."'0 There,
the Commission suspended Gilligan-Will for a period of five days
from membership in the NASD. The Commission overruled the
contention that it must decide the case on the basis of the dealer's
own transactions, apart from the transactions of others. The Com-
mission noted that a seller, particularly a registered broker-dealer,
may not safely rely upon a claim of a private offering exemption
when he does not have knowledge of the identity and number of
offerees and purchasers and of whether such purchasers intend to
offer and sell to others. The statute gives an aggrieved person the
right to appeal the order of the Commission to the United States court
of appeals for the circuit in which it resides or has its principal place
of business, or to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. '
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Commission,
and the court's opinion sets forth extensive quotable language up-
holding the Commission's interpretation of what is necessary to hold
1°e 1934 Act § 15(a)(5).
,06 1934 Act § lSA(i) (1). NASD Rules of Fair Practice § 25(a).
107 Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946). The broker-dealer was suspended from mem-
bership in the NASD for a period of twenty days.los 38 S.E.C. 388 (1958). Companion cases were Elliott & Co., 38 S.E.C. 381 (1958),
involving the principal broker-dealer handling the "placement" in which the Commission
suspended the firm's membership in the NASD for twenty days and Dempsey & Co., 38
S.E.C. 371 (1958) in which the Commission suspended the firm's membership in the NASD
for five days. Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 784 (1959).09 1934 Act S 25(a).
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for investment in order to prevent a purchaser in a private offering
transaction from being an underwriter. '
D. F. Bernheimer & Co., Inc.' involved an offering to twenty-two
offerees of $250,000 of convertible debentures of a small sulphur
company. The debentures were converted approximately two years
later. The purchasers did not execute investment letters. The Com-
mission found that false and misleading statements had been made
and that respondent had failed to produce evidence showing that
offerees had special knowledge of the issuer and were in a position
to fend for themselves; therefore, the exemption was not available.
The dealer was suspended from membership in the NASD for six
months.
In Robinette & Co."' the Commission found that a sale of $100,000
of convertible debentures in a cosmetics company to "at least"
ten purchasers, some of whom were already stockholders, was not
exempt. The Commission noted that each of five salesmen was told
that he could offer the debentures to ten to twenty-five customers,
"advice hardly consistent with the concept of a non-public offering,"
and that although some of the purchasers were stockholders, they had
no special relationship to the issuer and "were not only relatively
unsophisticated but ... woefully lacking in knowledge of the issuer's
affairs." The Commission concluded, "Under no circumstances could
they be considered persons who did not need the protection of the
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act." Here again, however,
the Commission also found that false and misleading representations
had been made to the purchasers, together with other violations of
the 1934 act and rules.
In a consolidated proceeding which involved disciplinary actions
against four broker-dealer firms (as well as a stop-order proceeding
under the Securities Act and a suspension order proceeding under reg-
ulation A) ... the Commission found failure by one corporation to dis-
close contingent liabilities for fraudulent sales of unregistered securi-
ties, a failure by another corporation to comply with the terms of the
regulation A procedure, and violations of the registration provisions
by the participating broker-dealers. Among the transactions found
not to have qualified for the private offering exemption were:
"0 Gilligan, Will & Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 896.
... SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7000 (1963).
"'SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7386, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 77,118
(1964).
1'Advanced Research Associates, Inc. and consolidated matters, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 4630; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7117 (1963). See also
Aviation Investors of America, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7113 (1963).
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(1) an offering of 97,000 shares of stock to twenty-one persons,
eighteen of whom purchased, where there were subsequent transfers
within the existing group of shareholders with one exception;
(2) an offering of $125,000 of convertible debentures to at least
thirty-three persons, of whom twenty-six purchased and at least four
of whom resold to nine other persons within a few months;
(3) a sale of $35,000 of convertible bonds to sixteen persons out
of a total of eighteen offerees;
(4) an issue of 247,500 shares, of which 130,000 shares were issued
in a reorganization to officers and directors of a closed corporation,
a substantial portion of which was shortly thereafter resold.
The Commission also found the use of false and misleading state-
ments, market manipulations, and excessive mark-ups in selling the
securities. The registrations of the various broker-dealer firms in-
volved were revoked.
D. Stop-Order Cases
Under section 8 (d) of the securities act if it appears to the Com-
mission at any time that a registration statement includes any untrue
statement of material fact or omits to state any material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, the Commission may, after appropriate notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing, issue a stop-order suspending the effectiveness
of the registration statement. There are a number of SEC decisions
finding, as one or more grounds for issuance of a stop-order, the
failure to disclose in the prospectus that sales were effected in viola-
tion of the act and to provide in the financial statements for the
resulting contingent liabilities.
The following cases illustrate fact situations which the Commis-
sion held did not qualify for the private offering exemption.
Hazel Bishop, Inc. " involved the filing of a registration statement
covering over 1,000,000 shares of common stock on behalf of 112
stockholders who proposed to sell their stock from time to time at
prices current at the time of sale through brokers on the American
Stock Exchange, in the open market, or otherwise. The registrant
claimed that previous unregistered sales (562,500 shares) by the
registrant to the stockholders on whose behalf the registration state-
ment was filed (most of which were included in the registration
statement) were exempt from registration under section 4 (1) of the
act [section 4(2) under the 1964 amendments] as transactions not
involving a public offering. The registrant had relied upon opinions
of counsel to that effect. The stock had been issued to and held in the
11440 S.E.C. 718 (1961).
[Vol. 20:503
PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION
names of thirty-two persons who executed investment letters with a
legend on the certificates restricting resale, pledge, or hypothecation
of the stock. The record revealed that some of the persons held stock
for a large number of other persons, some shares being sold for cash
without the new owner receiving any document of ownership. Fur-
ther, even though the registration statement was filed on behalf of
112 selling security holders, the record actually showed at least 150
beneficial owners. There had been a number of sales in the open
market in less than a year although the sellers had signed investment
letters. The Commission's conclusion is a succinct summary of
the effect of such transactions upon a subsequent registration state-
ment:
By virtue of sales of shares in violation of the provisions of Section
5 of the Act, registrant became contingently liable under Section 12 (1)
of the Act, to purchasers of such shares for rescission or damages. The
affirmative claim to an exemption, the omission of facts revealing
widespread violations and the failure of the registration statement and
the financial statements included therein to disclose the existence of
contingent liabilities with respect to such violations rendered it ma-
terially misleading.
Skiatron Electronics ef Television Corp."' concerned the regis-
tration of shares of common stock covered by warrants held by a
licensee of the registrant's pay TV system. The licensee borrowed
156,000 shares of registrant's stock from its president to pledge as
collateral to secure loans for working capital, of which 78,200 shares
were sold by the pledgee. The licensee also exercised options to pur-
chase unregistered stock of the registrant to secure other loans and
sold and pledged other warrants as collateral for loans. Within two
years all warrants had been exercised and all pledged shares sold to
the public. The president of the registrant owned 700,000 shares and
held options on 30,000 additional shares. During a three-year period
he sold 400,000 shares in the open market while he was also purchas-
ing stock by exercising his options. The Commission rejected the
claim to exemption under the former section 4 (1) as well as under.
rule 154 and issued a stop order for the registration."'
Ten promoters and fifty-one other persons who were also desig-
isa40 S.E.C. 236 (1960). See also National Lithium Corp., 40 S.E.C. 746 (1961); Min-
erals Consol., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 470 (1959); Cameron Indus., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 540 (1959);
White Caps Gold Mining Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4774 (1965); Hercules
Mining Co., Inc., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4787 (1965).
11 The Commission held that rule 154 "provides no exemption for an issuer or a con-
trolling person of an issuer, but merely sets out certain standards as aids in determining
when transactions by brokers are [exempt] routine trading transactions." Skiatron Elec-
tronics & Television Corp., 40 S.E.C. 236, 249 (1960).
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nated promoters, apparently to lend credibility to their informed
position, received unregistered stock in Republic Cement Corp."'
The Commission found that the fifty-one other persons were not in
fact promoters but merely investors. Registrant had issued 10,410
shares for cash at ten dollars a share and 696,570 shares for promo-
tional services. The Commission noted that sales made to residents of
Southern California and Texas were consummated in Nevada pur-
suant to powers of attorney. The Commission stated:
The diverse geographical location of the offerees and the circuitous ef-
forts taken by registrant's officers to avoid local Blue Sky Laws are
additional circumstances indicating that there was not involved the
type of private offering contemplated by Section 4(1) when applied to
a new venture, namely, one made to a small group of informed offerees
to finance its organization and preliminary operations.
The suspension order procedures under regulation A are a form of
stop-order proceeding. In the filing, the seller must disclose sales
made within one year without registration and establish the reason
why such sales were exempt from registration. The regulation pro-
vides for the issuance of suspension orders which either prevent the
filing from becoming effective or suspend the effectiveness if it has
already become effective. There are numerous cases in which sales
of unregistered stock were found not to be entitled to the private
offering exemption and grounds for issuance of suspension orders."'
E. Actions Against Transfer Agents To Compel Transfer
As mentioned earlier, one of the mechanical precautionary tech-
niques to effect practical compliance with the holding-for-investment
requirement is stamping a legend on the certificate disclosing the
investment instruction and issuing instructions to the transfer agent
of the corporation to note a stop-transfer in its stock records."'
This is a reasonably effective manner by which the issuer can protect
itself against violating the act. In fact, the failure of an issuer who
has made a private placement to provide effectively for stop-transfer
procedures may be deemed by the SEC to make the issuer a party to
a subsequent distribution by the purchaser. ' "
There have been two recent cases involving actions to allow a
11738 S.E.C. 19 (1957).
.. See Northeast Telecommunications, Inc., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4622
(1963); Acme Tool & Eng'r Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4630 (1963), one of
consolidated cases referred to in note 113 supra; Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4629 (1963).
i See text related to note 65 supra.
" SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 41; Symposium-Current Problems
of Securities Underwriters and Dealers, 18 Bus. LAW 27, 86 (1962); Victor & Bedrick,
supra note 58, at 871.
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transfer against transfer agents by purchasers of investment-letter
stock. In Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc.," 5 the court by sum-
mary judgment granted a mandatory injunction to a corporation and
its transfer agent ordering them to effect a transfer of stock acquired
subject to an investment representation. The plaintiff had purchased
10,000 shares from the corporation at a time when he was the corpo-
ration's special counsel for handling financial matters. His relation-
ship with the company terminated, and approximately three years
after he had purchased the stock, he obtained both an opinion from
another attorney and a concurring no-action letter from the SEC
that he was free to dispose of the stock, either publicly or privately,
without registration. The transfer agent contended that the no-action
letter from the Commission was not binding and that this would not
preclude the issuer from exercising its own judgment as to what was
necessary to protect itself from violations of the act by reason of the
sale of unregistered stock. This case establishes a combination of a
three-year holding plus a "change in circumstances" represented by
a termination of an attorney-client relationship.""
In Friedman v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,s' the New
York trial court granted a permanent injunction directing the trans-
fer agent to effect a transfer of securities where the plaintiff who had
purchased the securities for investment purposes held the securities
for five years and was compelled to sell to meet financial burdens.
Plaintiff had obtained a no-action letter from the SEC staff. The
opinion stated that the court would not permit the defendant to raise
conjectures and suspicion concerning the accuracy of the facts urged
in the plaintiff's application for the no-action letter.
In Prudential Petroleum Corp. v. Rauscher, Pierce Co.'" a corpora-
tion had acted as its own transfer agent and had refused to transfer
shares. Although such shares were subject to an investment letter,
the certificate for them had not been legended. The corporation was
in the process of clearing the sale of 200,000 shares under regulation A
and put a stop-transfer on all outstanding shares. The corporation
was held liable for conversion to a securities dealer. The court held
that, there being no restriction on the face of the certificate, a refusal
to transfer record ownership resulted in a liability for conversion.
12' 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965).
" That cessation of an attorney-client relationship between stockholder and issuer might
be a valid change of circumstance was suggested by George Duff at the P.L.I. Forum in
Problems of Controlling Stockholders. See P.L.I. CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS, at 35.
'm 153 N.Y.L.J. No. 70 (Super. Ct. N.Y. County, 1965), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,519.




It can be seen from the foregoing review of SEC and judicial deci-
sions that reliance on the non-public offering exemption in any
financing not involving a private placement with institutional type
investors is a hazardous risk. Milton H. Cohen in his very thought-
provoking article, "rTruth in Securities"-Revisited,"' which distills
insight gained while he was Director of the SEC's Special Study of
Securities Markets, presents a program for a coordinated disclosure
system which would integrate the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act with those of the Exchange Act. He advocates a dis-
tinction in the treatment of those issuers which are subject to the
filing requirements of the Exchange Act, which refers to as "con-
tinuous registrants," and those issuers which are not continuous regis-
trants.
Mr. Cohen suggests that with respect to non-public offerings of
issuers who are not continuous registrants there be a conclusive pre-
sumption that an offering "effectively confined to" a designated
number of offerees, "25, 50, perhaps even 100" be exempt from reg-
istration. However, he stresses the need for an effective provision
insuring that any reoffering by the purchasers in such a non-public
offering, which would cause the issuer to be a "public company,"
would result in the purchasers' being deemed underwriters, at least
insofar as making any distribution attributable to the issuer."'
He further suggests that the no-sale rule (rule 133) not be avail-
able to the securities of any issuer who is not a continuous registrant.
Perhaps the rule should be limited further so that a non-public com-
pany would not be permitted to use a rule 133 transaction as a
means of going public except pursuant to a registration statement.
It is, of course, obvious that a program coordinating the filing
requirements of the 1933 and 1934 acts is a legislative one that by its
very nature could not be achieved for several years.' Such coordina-
tion would be of primary benefit to companies which are continuous
registrants and for which it is relatively easy to achieve an effective
registration statement. However, there is an economic need for an
exemption from registration for a small speculative company in an
early stage of its operations whereby it may be permitted to seek
risk capital in a "semi-public offering." In the case of a state the size
125 See supra note 11.
121 Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. 1340, 1404 (1966).
127 Compare the policy of the American Stock Exchange with respect to "backdoor"
listings. CCH, AM. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE, 5 10,032 (1961).
aasE.g., the extensive amendment program undertaken in 1940 and 1941, which was
interrupted by the war and subsequently abandoned.
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of Texas, it is possible to achieve such financing through the use of
the intrastate offering exemption,"' although as is set forth in foot-
note 44, supra, registration under the Texas Securities Act is required
if the issuer will have over thirty-five security holders except to the
extent that it may thereafter make sales to as many as fifteen per-
sons in a one-year period. In business communities such as the Chicago
and New York areas, reliance on the intrastate offering exemption is
not generally advisable.3 0 An appropriate solution of the dilemma
occasioned by the narrow construction of the private offering
exemption might be the adoption by the SEC of a new regulation
under section 3 (b) which would be available on a simple notification
basis and use of a very brief offering circular. This could apply to
an issue of securities within the $300,000 limitation of that section of-
fered to not over one hundred persons and purchased in amounts of
not less than a specified sum, such as $5,000 by not over fifty owners
of beneficial interest. Such an exemption, conditioned on an offering
to a limited number of actual purchasers and on a disclosure of the
terms of the offering to the Commission to prevent fraud, would offer
reasonable protection to investors without unduly restricting the
access of small business to individual risk-taking investors."' While
the Small Business Investment Act program has filled the gap to some
degree, it is believed that more definitive ground rules are needed on
offerings to private investor groups who may be beyond the "few
closely related persons" allowed for in the Commission's interpretation
of the scope of the private offering exemption."'
129 Section 3 (a) (11) exempts from registration: "Any security which is part of an issue
offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State . . . where the issuer . . .
is a person resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and
doing business within, such State."
1a See statement on limitation of that exemption in SEC Securities Act Release No.
4434 (1961), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 2270.
sas See text related to notes 9 and 10 supra. The increased complexity was occasioned in
particular by the problems incurred by the SEC during the uranium stock boom of 1955-
1956. The major hazard of the use of regulation A is that despite the elaborate nature of
the filing, it is still in theory an "exemption" from registration with the burden of
establishing the exemption's existence being on the user. See Weiss, Regulation A Under the
Securities Act of 1933-Highways and Byways, 38 N.Y.L.F. 3 (1962).
... SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11316, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
2770 (1962).
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